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Abstract:
Today’s large-scale computations, e.g., in the Cloud, are subject to a multitude of risks concerning
the divulging and ownership of private data. Privacy risks are mainly addressed using a large variety
of encryption-based techniques. However, these are costly to operate, lead to large aggregates
of data that are highly valuable attack targets and do not allow to flexibly handle subsets of
such aggregates. Furthermore, today’s computations have to ensure privacy properties in the
context over highly variable and complex software compositions; however, no general support
for the declarative definition and implementation of privacy-preserving applications has been put
forward.
This article presents a compositional approach to the declarative and correct composition of
privacy-preserving applications in the Cloud. Our approach provides language support for the
compositional definition of encryption- and fragmentation-based privacy-preserving algorithms.
This language comes equipped with a set of laws that allows us to verify privacy properties. Fi-
nally, we introduce implementation support in Scala that ensures certain privacy properties by
construction using advanced features of Scala’s type system.
Key-words: Language, Fragmentation, Encryption, Client-side computation, Typing, Algebraic
laws
∗ École des Mines de Nantes, Nantes, France: firstname.lastname@mines-nantes.fr
Langage pour la composition des techniques de protection
de la vie privée
Résumé :
Aujourd’hui, et notamment à cause de l’Informatique en Nuage, les calculs à larges échelles
sont risqués pour le respect de la vie privée. Une manière généralement utilisée pour garantir
la vie privée est d’utiliser les techniques de chiffrement qui rendent les données privées lisibles
que par les personnes autorisées. Elles représentent une protection très efficace lorsque seul le
stockage est considéré. Mais, leur emploi devient très couteux lorsque d’autres formes de calculs
doivent être effectuées sur les données chiffrées. L’utilité des techniques de chiffrement est donc
limitée pour les systèmes à larges échelles.
Nous considérons que le protection de la vie privée dans les systèmes à larges échelles est
possible. Mais, les développeurs d’applications ne doivent pas se limiter aux techniques de
chiffrement. Ils doivent envisager la composition des différentes techniques de protection de
la vie privée. Cet article présente un langage pour la composition correcte des techniques de
protection de la vie privée. Le langage est équipé de lois algébriques qui nous permettent de
vérifier le respect de la vie privée. Enfin, nous proposons un support de programmation en Scala
pour notre langage. Le support utilise le système de type de Scala pour assurer la composition
correcte.
Mots-clés : Langage, Fragmentation, Chiffrement, Calculs côté client, Typage, Lois algébriques
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1 Introduction
The generalization of large-scale service-based computations executed over mutualized resources,
notably in the context of Cloud computing, has considerably increased the risk of losing control
or even ownership of one’s personal data. In particular, the confidentiality and integrity of
private data are at risk. Currently, privacy-preserving computations use encryption techniques
in order to preserve such properties of private data. However, these techniques have important
drawbacks. They are costly to apply. They result in much data being kept in one place (being
a prime target for attacks). And they do not allow to flexibly handle subsets of encrypted data.
In order to improve on these characteristics, alternative approaches have been explored. Data
fragmentation [ABG+05, dVEF+13], in particular, consists in dividing data sets into different
parts and store them in different places. No unauthorized party can thus extract sensitive
information from the pieces. Fragmentation allows to eliminate (much of) the computational
overhead incurred by en/decryption. It allows the distribution of data on a multitude of sites
and supports the handling of subsets of data sets. Because fragmentation-based approaches
frequently use encryption for parts of the data and computations, handling privacy properties
results in complex compositions of privacy techniques. However, no comprehensive composition
approach for the construction of privacy-preserving computations has been put forward until
today.
Figures 1a and 1b show the need for such a comprehensive composition approach for the
construction of privacy-preserving computations. The first illustrates a privacy-preserving query
(of the number, per day, of meetings Alice had in her office last week) on a local application.
The query is easy to formulate because Alice’s data is stored locally and is not subject to privacy
problems. However, the same computation in the context of cloud computing requires to encrypt
the database. Then, Alice has to decrypt the database at her side to perform the query and
encrypt the result once again, which is obviously not efficient. The second illustration shows
how the composition of encryption with fragmentation can improve the query efficiency. The
database is fragmented so that no privacy concerns can be violated: many queries can thus
operate without any decryption overhead. However, in this case the formulation of queries is far
more difficult and error-prone.
Currently, compositions of privacy-ensuring strategies are programmed using traditional pro-
gramming means (languages or frameworks) that do not provide any correctness guarantees.
This state-of-affairs is, however, clearly unsatisfying, leads to numerous privacy violations in the
real world, and incurs steep costs for individuals as for the society as a whole.
In this paper, we introduce the following contributions:
• A motivation for the need of dedicated means for the correct composition of different privacy-
enforcing strategies, in particular, strategies based on encryption, fragmentation and client
Alice
1.meetings?
Agenda
AgendaDB
(date,name,address)
App
2.SELECT COUNT(*)
  FROM AgendaDB
  WHERE today-date<8
  AND address = 'desk'
  GROUP BY (date)
3.#meetings
4.[#meetings]
(a) Local Application
Alice
1.m
eet
ing
s?
Frag2
(HEq(name),address,id)
Agenda
22.SELECT id
  FROM Frag2
  WHERE address = 'desk'
31.[[date,id]]
32.[id]
Frag1
(date,id)
21.SELECT date,id
  FROM Frag1
  WHERE today-date<8
  GROUP BY (date)
4.join
  count
(b) Cloud Application
Figure 1: Privacy-Preserving Agenda as Local (a) and Cloud (b) Application
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side computation. (Sec. 2)
• A language for the declarative definition of a range of (composed) strategies for the enforce-
ment of privacy-centric properties based on encryption and fragmentation algorithms. The
language comes equipped with a set of laws that ensure a number of properties ensuring
privacy-properties. (Sec. 3)
• An implementation of the language in Scala that harnesses advanced typing properties in
order to support the enforcement of privacy properties. (Sec. 4)
In addition, the paper discusses related work (Sec. 5) and provides a conclusion and future works
(Sec. 6).
2 Motivation
Consider an application developed for the Cloud in order to improve, for instance, its availability,
data replication properties or integration with other applications. Typically, the basic workflow
consists in first the outsourcing of user data to a database service, and then applying applications
hosted in the cloud to that data. For the case of the agenda application, one has first to subscribe
to a cloud database service and outsource meeting data, and then install the agenda application
on a Cloud platform.
The privacy concern In the age of cloud computing, cloud application programmers out-
source without any consideration personal data of individuals. Outsourcing reveals personal data
to cloud providers that can share information with third parties. This represents the Achilles’
heel of cloud computing: how to share data and keep personal data private.
To handle the privacy concern, two types of approaches have been introduced. The first
focuses on supervised cloud. It includes approaches relying on access control and policy enforce-
ment [PM11,CJL12] to support accountability for violations [WABL+08]. The second focuses on
the unsupervised cloud. It is a set of techniques to keep data private, such as encryption [Sal03],
fragmentation [dVEF+13], differential privacy [RP10] and client side computation [FKDL13].
Each technique has pros and cons but, in general, they are limited, and do not offer as many
guarantees as policy enforcement. For instance, data encryption fits for storage protection but
not for computations and differential privacy is useful for statistical databases only. The main
advantage is that they are applicable to real world problems.
This article handles the privacy concern in unsupervised clouds. We show that even if each
technique taking by itself is limited, the composition of such techniques is much more effective
and enables the development of expressive privacy-preserving cloud applications. In the remain-
der of this article, we will focus on the composition of three classes of techniques: encryption,
fragmentation and client-side computations.
2.1 Encryption, Fragmentation and Client-Side Computations
Encryption Encryption [Sal03] is the process of encoding information before it is outsourced
in such a way that only authorized parties can read it.
Historically, encryption is the first approach to the protection of private databases in the
Cloud. Using, for instance, a symmetric encryption algorithm, a client encrypts its data before
outsourcing it in the cloud. All queries can then simply be executed by first returning the
necessary data from the database to the client in its encrypted state, be decrypted by her, and
execute the query at her side. This approach is, however, far too expensive to be practical.
One solution to this problem are recent encryption schemes, so called homomorphic ones, that
execute query directly on encrypted data.
Inria
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Theoretically, fully homomorphic schemes enable arbitrary operations to be performed on
encrypted data. However, these schemes are prohibitively expensive. Reasonably efficient ho-
momorphic schemes are currently known only for a small set of operations. A deterministic
encryption scheme, e.g., permits efficiently to check the equality of values by comparing en-
crypted data. For this reason, query execution over encrypted data is often seen as practical
only if corresponding efficient homomorphic encryption schemes are available [NLV11].
Fragmentation (Vertical) fragmentation [ABG+05, dVEF+13] is the process of separating
information into non-linkable fragments in such a way that only authorized parties can recompose
the original information. Fragmentation is applicable when associations of data are sensitive
rather than individual data items themselves.
Fragmentation is tightly coupled to the notion of privacy constraints. A privacy constraint
specifies which data is sensitive and should, therefore, be kept confidential. In our agenda
application, for instance, meetings should satisfy two privacy constraints. An agenda meeting is
the triplet (date, name, address) that represents the meeting date, the name of the contact and
the meeting location. The first constraint is {date, address} so that an attacker cannot localize
Alice by associating an address to a meeting date. The second constraint should be {name} so
that an attacker cannot infer the name of Alice’s contacts. Here, fragmentation aims to make
privacy associations such as {date, address} safe by splitting the triplet (date, name, address) in
two.
Client-side computation Client-side computation [FKDL13] designates the concept of let-
ting clients perform sensitive computations on their own and upload only the results. Especially,
client side computation stores private information at the client side. Thus, computations on
private data are performed at the client side. Services that require strong guarantees on the
truthfulness of the result, such as billing service, can use, e.g., zero-knowledge protocols to en-
sure the integrity of the query results and privacy.
2.2 Composition of Privacy-Enforcement Techniques
The application Figure 1b shows a common case in which a composition of techniques is
required to obtain efficient and private application in the cloud. The application is the cloud
version of the local the one (Fig. 1a) and requires a composition of encryption, fragmentation
and client-side computation.
To distribute this agenda application in a privacy-preserving manner, the programmer adopts
the two privacy constraints {date, address} and {name} introduced in Sec. 2.1. A programmer
then has to choose a configuration for the application that satisfies the privacy constraints. First,
she may, e.g., fragment the database in two. The first fragment contains the dates. The second
contains the names and addresses. Now, the {date, address} constraint is safe unless the two
fragments are joined. Then, the programmer encrypts names with an homomorphic encryption
that supports equality, thus ensuring that the {name} constraint is satisfied.
Based on such a configuration, e.g., the query that computes the number of meetings Alice
had per day at her desk last week (1 in Fig. 1b) is distributed on both fragments. It applies
selection and grouping operations on the first fragment (21) to obtain the dates and identifiers
of the meetings of the past week. At the same time, it applies the selection on the second
fragment (22) to get identifiers of the office meetings. The application then fully harnesses the
cloud, whether for storage or querying. However, the agenda has to join results of both fragments
to count the number of people. Because that operation is not privacy preserving, finally, the rest
of the query is executed at Alice’s side (3),(4).
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Alice
1.p
eop
le?
FragRight
(HEq(name),address,id)
Agenda
4.SELECT COUNT(*)
  FROM FragRight
  WHERE id in ids
  GROUP BY (name)
3.ids = [id]
5.[#people]
FragLeft
(date,id)
2.SELECT id
  FROM FragLeft
  WHERE today-date<8
Figure 2: Number of people Alice met last week
Another useful query built on top of cloud configuration is the number of people Alice has
met last week (Fig. 2). The query uses a left-first strategy of fragmentation to be efficient. It
applies the selection on the left fragment to get identifiers of meetings the past week (2), (3).
It then applies projection and grouping operations to the right fragment. And the programmer
uses identifiers obtained from the left fragment to reduce the number components (4). The
grouping operation requires to compare names, but this is fine since names are encrypted with an
homomorphic scheme that supports equality testing. Moreover, the overhead due to encryption
is minimal because the selection largely reduces the number of comparisons.
2.3 Language-Support to the Rescue
The above examples, as well as the large majority of real Cloud applications, require several
privacy techniques to be composed. In this case, errors easily slip in. For instance, trying to
encrypt twice the same column in a database does not make sense. Similarly, trying to sum
values encrypted with a symmetric scheme is not reasonable.
To help programmers composing privacy techniques, we propose a functional language that
focuses on privacy protection and query computation. As input, we have a privacy relation
and apply privacy/query functions in turn to reduce the number of components in the relation.
Together with the language, a set of algebraic laws specifies how to transform a local program
to a privacy-preserving distributed Cloud application.
We are convinced that this formalization constitutes an appropriate abstraction to help pro-
grammers reason on query and privacy techniques composition. The corresponding language-level
and implementation support the declarative definition of privacy-preserving Cloud applications
and their efficient execution.
3 Language-based composition of privacy-enforcement tech-
niques
This section defines our language for composition of encryption, fragmentation and client side
computation techniques. First, we introduce its commands based on a SQL-like query language
extended with abstractions for fragmentation and encryption. Second, we show how a query
can be transformed by introducing privacy commands. Finally, we formalize and generalize our
approach by corresponding composition laws.
Inria
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3.1 Language Description
Our language is based on database queries obeying relational algebra properties.
A relation (i.e., a table) is a set of tuples. For instance, an agenda stores a meeting as a triple
(date, name, address) representing the meeting date, the name of the contact and the meeting
location. Our language offers four query functions:
• A selection σ filters tuples of a relation. For instance, lastWeekAtDesk = σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
keeps meetings whose date is at most a week old and has desk as meeting venue.
• A projection pi keeps a subset of the columns of a relation. For instance days = pidate keeps
only the date of meetings.
• A grouping definition group groups together tuples of a relation. For instance, byDay =
groupdate creates a group of tuples for each date.
• An aggregation fold computes a single value for groups. For instance, count = fold (+1) 0
counts the number of meeting in a group.
Note that we omit a product operation of tables because it is not required by our examples
but it could be easily introduced. These functions can be composed (◦) in order to define complex
queries according to the following grammar:
Q ::= Q ◦Q | σ | pi | group | fold f k
Note that a sequence of function compositions is read from right to left. For instance, the number
of meetings per day at desk last week is:
#meeting = count ◦ byDay ◦ days ◦ lastWeekAtDesk
Our language also provides privacy-related pairs of functions:
• crypts,as/decrypts,as encrypts/decrypts the components of tuples corresponding to pias. For
instance, cryptContact = cryptheq,name encrypts the contacts in the agenda, although they
still can be compared because heq is an homomorphic encryption that supports equality.
• fragpias/defragpias vertically fragments/defragments a table of tuples into two tables of tuples,
so that the tuples of the first table contain only the components corresponding to pias and
the tuples of the second table contain the remaining components (noted pia¯s). For instance,
fragDate = fragpidate fragments the agenda table into a first table for the dates and a second
table for the names and addresses. Remember [ABG+05] that in both tables each tuple also
contains an index in order to reconstruct the original tuples.
• fragσp/defragσp horizontally fragments/defragments a table of tuples into two tables. For
instance, fraglastWeek fragments the agenda into two tables of meetings. The first table
contains only the meetings of last week and the second table contains the older meetings.
These privacy functions can be composed to make queries privacy-aware as defined by the
following grammar:
Qp ::= Qp ◦Qp | Q | crypt | decrypt | frag | defrag
RR n° 8720
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For instance, when the agenda is fragmented (date on one host, name and address on another
host) and the identity of contacts is encrypted, the query for the number of meetings per day at
desk last week is:
#meetingPrivate = count ◦ defragDate
◦ (byDay ◦ days ◦ lastWeek, atDesk)
◦ fragDate ◦ cryptContact
It can be read as: encrypt the contacts’ names, then fragment the table, select the meeting dates
of last week on the first fragment and group them, select the meeting with desk as venue on the
second fragment, defragment the results in order to get a group by day but only for desk venue,
and finally count the number of groups (i.e., meetings per day). Note that there is no need to
call the decrypt function here because count does not require values, but count must be executed
at client side because defrag discards protection.
The next section shows how to transform the centralized query #meeting into the private
one #meetingPrivate.
3.2 Making Private a Query with Transformations
The centralized query that computes the number of meeting per day at desk last week is:
Q1 ≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
It can be decentralized by introducing privacy-related functions. First, we add frag then defrag
at the beginning (i.e., right) of the query. This is correct since these functions are inverse
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
◦ defragpidate ◦ fragpidate
Similarly we introduce encryption
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8)∧(address=desk)
◦ defragpidate ◦ fragpidate
◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt and defrag must be executed at the owner’s place since they discard protection, so we
delay them to the left. defrag commutes with σ, but the selection must be applied only to the
relevant fragment
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ defragpidate
◦ (σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
defrag and pi commutes, but the selection must be applied to each frament
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ defragpidate
◦ (pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), pidate ◦ σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
Inria
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The projection on components missing in the fragment can be simplified
≡ count ◦ groupdate ◦ defragpidate
◦ (pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
defrag and group commutes, but grouping must be performed only in the relevant fragment
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt commutes with frag, must be applied to both fragments and it can be simplified when
components are missing in the fragment
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8),
σ(address=desk) ◦ decryptheq,name)
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt commutes with σ, the predicate of σ does not work on encrypted data, thus it does not
require homomorphic encryption to compute selection
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8),
decryptheq,name ◦ σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
decrypt commutes with defrag
≡ count ◦ decryptheq,name ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name
Finally count computes the number of groups but it does not rely on the value of tuples, so they
do not require to be decrypted
≡ count ◦ defragpidate
◦ (groupdate ◦ pidate ◦ σ(today−date<8), σ(address=desk))
◦ fragpidate ◦ cryptheq,name 
3.3 Laws for Composition
We now generalize our transformational approach by formally-defined composition laws follow-
ing Backus’s approach [Bac78]. They specify how protection and query functions interact, in
particular how they commute. We review them briefly.
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First, the Identity Laws specify that pairs of protection functions are inverse to each other.
Applying a protection then discarding a protection results in no protection. When oriented from
left to right, these three rules can be used to introduce privacy functions in a query:
id ≡ decrypts,as ◦ crypts,as (1)
id ≡ defragpias ◦ fragpias (2)
id ≡ defragσp ◦ fragσp (3)
Second, all other rules specify when protection-discarding and query-functions commute.
They can be used to delay the discarding of protection (i.e., “push” defrag/decrypt to the left
in a query); intuitively, this means that more computations are performed in the cloud rather
than at the owner’s site.
The Projection Laws, (4) specifies that projection and decrypt commute. When fragmentation
is used, laws (5)-(8) specify a projection becomes a pair of projections (one per fragment):
pia ◦ decrypts,a ≡ decrypts,a ◦ pia (4)
piaa¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (pia, pia¯) (5)
pia ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (pia, pia) (6)
pia¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (pia¯, pia¯) (7)
pia ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (pia, pia) (8)
Grouping Laws (9),(10) specify that decrypt and group commute. When groups are based on
encrypted components, group must take into account encryption (10). Vertical fragmentation
and group commute, when groups can be computed in a single fragment (11),(12). Horizontal
fragmentation and group commute and groups must be computed in both fragments (13):
groupa ◦ decrypts,b ≡ decrypts,b ◦ groupa if a /∈ (b) (9)
groupa ◦ decrypts,b ≡ decrypts,b ◦ groupsa if a ∈ (b) (10)
groupa ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (groupa, id) (11)
groupa¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (id, groupa¯) (12)
groupa ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (groupa, groupa) (13)
Selection Laws are quite similar to Grouping Laws, but the different cases are based on
predicate parts dealing with one fragment, the other or both. In particular, (16) requires σpaa¯
to select tuples in both vertical fragments after the defragmentation (i.e., at owner’s place):
σp ◦ decrypts,a ≡ decrypts,a ◦ σp if dom(p) /∈P(a) (14)
σp ◦ decrypts,a ≡ decrypts,a ◦ σsp if dom(p) ∈P(a) (15)
σpa∧pa¯∧paa¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ σpaa¯ ◦ defragpia ◦ (σpa, σpa¯) (16)
σpa∧t∧t ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (σpa, id) (17)
σt∧pa¯∧t ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (id, σpa¯) (18)
σp′ ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (σp′ , σp′) (19)
In law (20), count does not access values so that decrypt can be discarded:
count ◦ decrypts,as ≡ count (20)
Inria
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Finally, Protection Composition Laws commute and distribute functions in order to apply
previous laws:
f ◦ id ≡ id ◦ f ≡ f (21)
(f1, f2) ◦ (g1, g2) ≡ (f1 ◦ f2, g1 ◦ g2) (22)
fragpia ◦ decrypts,a ≡ (decrypts,a, id) ◦ fragpia (23)
fragpia ◦ decrypts,a¯ ≡ (id, decrypts,a¯) ◦ fragpia (24)
decrypts,a ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (decrypts,a, id) (25)
decrypts,a¯ ◦ defragpia ≡ defragpia ◦ (id, decrypts,a¯) (26)
fragσp ◦ decrypts,a ≡ (decrypts,a, decrypts,a) ◦ fragσp (27)
decrypts,a ◦ defragσp ≡ defragσp ◦ (decrypts,a, decrypts,a) (28)
4 Implementation
The functional DSL for the composition of privacy-aware query-based applications introduced
above permits the definition of Functional Programming (FP)-like equivalence laws and the
transformation of a privacy-preserving local application into a privacy-preserving cloud applica-
tion. In this section, we present our Scala-based [OSV08,CB14] framework1, a prototype that
makes it possible to program sophisticated privacy-aware cloud applications. In particular, our
implementation satisfies the laws introduced previously and harnesses Scala’s type system to
make application conditions explicit that are required by the laws.
4.1 From Theory to Practice
One of the main differences between the DSL and the actual implementation is that we distinguish
functions that compute queries from functions that change the shape of the database. In the
previous section, the language uses the pointwise application of one function to the result of
another, which successively reduces the database until the result is obtained. This abstraction
helps reasoning on the query design. However, it misses practicality for real world programming
since we do not want to reduce our database and lose components. In practice, two different
levels of computation are more useful: one that uses database components to compute queries,
and another one that modifies the database shape and applies protection.
The programs in Fig. 3 query the number of meetings per day at the desk last week, for a
local (a) and a cloud (b) application. The local application only uses functions to query the
database (σ, pi, group and count). In contrast, the cloud application also composes functions
for protection (crypt and fragV).
The Guardian Monad. In functional programming, functions with side effects such as pro-
tection functions are performed in a monad [Wad92a], a pattern that makes it easy to chain
function calls. In particular, FP deals with side effects using a state monad [Wad92b] that at-
taches state information to function calls. For this reason, our framework provides a state monad
suitable for our purposes. Our state monad, called guardian, is defined based on the following
requirements:
• The state is the database.
1The sources of our framework and examples are available on the Github platform at https://github.com/
rcherrueau/phant
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1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 q <- query (db => {
4 val r1 = σ (db) (lastweek
5 ∧ atdesk)
6 val r2 = pi (r1) (date)
7 val r3 = group (r2) (date)
8 val r4 = count (r3); r4
9 })
10 } yield q
(a) Local Application
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 _ <- fragV (_1) (Site1(_), Site2(_))
5 qL <- queryL (fragL => {
6 val r1 = σ (fragL) (σlift lastweek)
7 val r2 = pi (r1) (pilift date)
8 val r3 = group (r2) (date); r3
9 })
10 qR <- queryR (fragR => {
11 val r1 = σ (fragR) (σlift atdesk)
12 val r2 = pi (r1) (id); r2
13 })
14 } yield count (gather (qL, qR))
(b) Cloud Application
Figure 3: Privacy-Preserving Agenda as Local (a) and Cloud (b) Application
• Query functions only access the components of the database. The application of a query
function returns some result that can be used as input for a second query, without modifying
the database. For instance, the selection in figure 3a accesses the content of the database and
returns the result in r1 (line 4). Values in r1 are then used for the projection (l.5) and so on,
until the count operation (l.7). At the end of the program (l.9), the q variable gets the result
of the query. But, the database remains the same as in input.
• Protection functions only modify the shape of a database. For instance, the crypt instruction
in figure 3b modifies the database by encrypting the second column with a homomorphic
scheme that supports equality testing (l.3). Similarly, the fragV instruction splits the database
vertically on the first column (l.4). It distributes the left fragment on site number one and
the right fragment on site number two. Henceforth, the querying should be done on both
fragments (l.5-13).
The protection functions crypt and fragV are complemented by discarding functions decrypt
and defragV. The discarding functions from the framework differ from the ones in the DSL
because the framework ones discard protection on the database, whereas the functions of the
DSL discard protections on the query result. In the DSL example of the cloud application
(Sec. 3.2), the call of defragpidate joins at the client side the result of both fragments and hands
it over to the count computation. In the corresponding implementation (Fig. 3b), calling a
defragV will join fragments but not the result of the queries. For this reason, the framework
provides the gather instruction, which is applied at the query level. It brings back data at the
client side and discards protection. Given this, the program 3b gathers the result from both
fragments in order to count the number of meetings (l.14). Note that in this example like in
the example of the DSL, the gather does not have to decrypt names because the right query
discards them.
Monadic programming and types. In example 3b it does not make sense to encrypt the
second column twice. As it does not make sense to query the fragmented database in the same
manner as the local database. Furthermore, it does not make sense to group on an encrypted
data that does not support equality testing. To put it simply, if privacy techniques are to be
composed, errors can easily be introduced that yield to runtime errors!
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A main feature of monads is the use of types to exhibit what it means to execute chained
function applications. Given this, the guardian monad exhibits useful information at the type
level to help the programmer write programs that cannot go wrong. For instance, the type of
the guardian at the end of program 3b is:
Guard[
Site0[DB[Raw[Date] |: Raw[Name] |: Raw[Addr]]], // (1)
(Site1[DB[Raw[Date] |: Id]], Site2[DB[HEq[Name] |: Raw[Addr] |: Id]]), // (2)
Site0[List[Int]]] // (3)
With:
(1) The shape of the database at the start of the computation. Here the guardian only accepts,
as input, database that stores date, name and address (i.e., DB[Date |: Name |: Addr]) in
plain form (i.e., Raw) and uploaded at client side (i.e., Site0).
(2) The shape of the database at the end of the computation. Here the guardian transforms
the database into two fragments. The first one stores dates in plain form at site one. The
second one stores names and addresses at site two. The guardian also encrypts names with a
homomorphic encryption that supports equality (i.e., HEq).
(3) The type of the query result. Here, the type of the number of meetings per day at the desk
last week (i.e., List[Int]). The Site0 annotation informs the developer that a part of the
query is computed at the client side.
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 // ill-typed , encryption of
5 // all-ready encrypted column:
6 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
7 // . . .
8 } yield ()
Figure 4: Twice encryption does not type
check
1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 _ <- fragV (_1) (Site1(_), Site2(_))
5 // ill-typed , query on a non-local
6 // database.
7 q <- query (db => { /* ... */ })
8 // ...
9 } yield ()
Figure 5: Fragmentation requires querying
on fragments
A guardian uses type information to ensure that compositions cannot go wrong and gives
useful information at compile time. Hence, trying to encrypt an already encrypted column does
not type check (Fig. 4). Querying a fragment with a local approach does not type check (Fig. 5).
Grouping/Filtering on an encrypted data that does not support the test does not type check (Fig. 6).
Generally speaking, the implementation satisfies the laws of section 3.3. We rely on property-
based testing with ScalaCheck [Nil07] to argue their correctness.
Finally, monad bindings enable the naming of query result such as in program 3b. Value qL
contains the result of the left query. Value qR contains the result of the right query. Naming is
essential when the programmer wants to implement a profitable strategy like the left-first strategy
from figure 2. Program 7 implements the left-first strategy. It simply consists of naming the
result of left fragment, and then use it in the right fragment.
4.2 Feedback on the Implementation with Scala
The Scala programming language is good for generalization. We harness an advanced use of Scala
implicits and type members to perform type-level computations [dSOMO10]. This enables the
definition of arity-polymorphic databases, so that the guardian monad can be implemented once
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1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 // Symmetric encryption of Name.
4 // Symmetric doesn’t support equatlity
5 // testing.
6 _ <- crypt (_2) (Symmetric(_))
7 q <- query (db => {
8 // ill-typed , name doesn’t
9 // support equality testing
10 groupby (db) (name)
11 })
12 // ...
13 } yield ()
Figure 6: Grouping on encrypted data requires support equality
and for all. Without an arity-polymorphic database we would have to write as many guardian
monads as a database could contain attributes, just like for tuples. In the previous examples
(e.g., Fig. 3b), the presence of integers prefixed by an underscore is the direct consequences
of type-level computation. Integers with an underscore are Church encodings of the natural
numbers at the type level. They make it possible to identify, at compile time, which column has
to be encrypted, and the type of both fragments after fragmentation.
Scala unifies functional and object-oriented programming. Under the hood, data are objects
and operations method calls. This object model is good for modularity and generalization, for
instance, with subtyping. However, it makes type inference less powerful than that of ML-like
functional languages that use the Hindley-Milner algorithm. Because of that, the guardian monad
sometimes requires to explicitly specifying the type to help the compiler infer type parameters.
The code examples we presented above are a beautified version, omitting a few type annotations
that are needed by the compiler, so that readers can more easily understand the intention of
the guardian monad. The code with all necessary type annotation is available on the Github
platform.
Finally, the guardian monad is a prototype, whose implementation proves its validity. In the
future we intend to bind the current implementation with nice Scala libraries such as Akka2 for
the distribution and Slick2for the mapping with real relational databases.
5 Related Work
In the following, we compare our work to three sets of related work: approaches that focus on
data fragmentation (but also including encryption), related work providing language support for
privacy properties and approaches, such as sticky policies and security-aware objects that enable
privacy properties to be expressed and enforced directly.
Data fragmentation is a recent technique that strives to ensure strong confidentiality proper-
ties without the query overhead of encryption-based approaches. A recent overview [dVEF+13]
presents a wide range of fragmentation techniques and corresponding algorithms. However, none
of the discussed approaches includes, as our approach provides, declarative means for the con-
struction of fragmentation algorithms, their composition especially with encapsulation techniques
and formal property guarantees over implementations.
Several language-based approaches have been proposed for other privacy properties. Tetali et
2http://akka.io/; http://slick.typesafe.com/
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1 for {
2 _ <- configure[Date,Name,Addr]
3 _ <- crypt (_2) (HEq(_))
4 _ <- fragV (_1) (Site1(_), Site2(_))
5 // Queries on left fragment to get identifiers
6 // of meetings the past week:
7 ids <- queryL (fragL => {
8 val r1 =
9 σ (fragL) (σlift lastweek)
10 val r2 = pi (r1) (id); r2
11 })
12 q <- queryR (fragR => {
13 // Reduces the number of
14 // elems with ids of left
15 val r1 = σ (fragR) {
16 case (_,_,id) =>
17 ids.exists(id)
18 }
19 val r2 = group (r1) (name)
20 val r3 = count (r2); r3
21 })
22 } yield q
Figure 7: Number of people Alice met last week – left-first strategy
al. [TLMM13], e.g., have proposed analysis techniques for compositions of different types of
homomorphic encryption algorithms. Fournet et al. [FKDL13] define ZQL, a query language
operating over annotated database schemas that use strong typing in order to ensure security
properties of generated implementations in F# and C++. Reed and Pierce [RP10] propose a
specialized type system to enforce privacy guarantees by means of differential privacy. However,
none of these approaches provides language support for the composition of fragmentation and
encapsulation techniques.
Another domain of related work consists in support for the expression of privacy properties
in the form of policies and constraints over accesses to runtime objects. Sticky policies [KSW02],
e.g., represent a class of policies that enable the abstract definition of privacy properties and their
enforcement through runtime annotations. Self-protecting software systems [YEM14], such as
self-defending objects [HCR04], support the protection of privacy properties of runtime entities
by strong encapsulation and access control of these entities. Again however, none of these
approaches, as well as other policy-based and encapsulation-based privacy techniques, support
properties involving the composition of fragmentation and encapsulation techniques.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we have addressed the problem of how to define and enforce privacy properties in
the context of complex computations executed in mutualized environments, such as the Cloud,
and that require different privacy-enforcing techniques to be used. We have considered privacy
properties that are formulated in terms of compositions of data fragmentation and encryption.
We have provided programming language support for the declarative definition of such com-
posed privacy-enforcement strategies and an implementation on top of the Scala language that,
using a specialized type system, ensures privacy properties by construction. We have also pro-
vided a set of laws that ensure privacy properties and that are satisfied by the language mecha-
nisms we provide.
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As future work we intend to extend the set of fragmentation techniques and approaches to
encryption in order to obtain a full-fledged composition theory for these two classes of privacy-
enforcing techniques.
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